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The recent Space Policy Directive-3, issued on June 18th, 2018, commands several sectors of the 
federal executive apparatus to reassess their current and future efforts to address space traffic 
management and space situational awareness issues. The reasons for this Directive can be boiled 
down to the belief that the continued use of the orbital realm depends on responsible 
management, which in turn depends on myriad factors that include the development of new 
technologies, the refinement of data gathering, and the clarification of governmental operational 
roles. In particular, the Directive calls for enhanced standardization of safety and best practices, 
and doles out tasks for relevant agencies, among which the Federal Communications 
Commission plays a significant role. Given the FCCs influence on the licensure of satellites and 
the proliferation of constellations, it will be a leader in fulfilling the obligations set out in SPD-3. 
In October of 2018, the FCC announced it would revisit its much older orbital debris 
management rules, with an eye towards their revision and in light of its responsibility for 
increasing traffic in outer space. In November, they released their Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, in which they tackle a multitude of germane topics, from spectrum use to orbital 
lifetime, and from choice of orbit to post-mission disposal. This essay proposes to examine how 
the FCC’s planned changes will address concerns outlined in SPD-3, and what work remains to 
be done. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In June of 2018, President Trump released Space Policy Directive-3.  This Directive was 
a detailed document, providing guidance and direction for several federal agencies involved in 
the matter of securing the continued use and enjoyment of the outer space environment.  Its focus 
was on the furtherance of Space Traffic Management (STM) policy, along with the related field 
of Space Situational Awareness (SSA).  The scope and depth of federal responsibility for 
improving these fields are expanded in SPD-3, with several federal agencies, departments, and 
their heads being drafted into revitalizing procedures for information gathering, inter-agency 
cooperation, and revision of extant policies and regulations.  Chief among the threats assessed by 
this policy is orbital debris.  The new policy aims to control and contain this threat, which poses 
dangers not only to the national economy, but also to national security and the ability to use and 
explore space more generally. 
 
Separate from yet related to the STM concerns of the current administration is the 
regulatory mission of the Federal Communications Commission.  The FCC has several tasks to 
perform in many arenas of public and private life, among these the responsibility to serve the 
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public good when considering whether to license satellites launched into outer space.  Given the 
need for most such satellites to utilize radiocommunication in order to properly function, the 
FCC’s topical authority is clear.1  The Commission has announced that it is aware of the release 
and meaning of SPD-3, yet “the Commission’s efforts to formulate this NPRM on orbital debris 
mitigation have been underway for some time, and we believe our proposals may provide a 
method of elevating these important issues for consideration among federal policymakers and 
stakeholders.”2  Presently, then, we are seeing the confluence of both Space Policy Directive-3, 
and proposed rules and revisions to extant FCC orbital debris requirements. 
 
Currently, the United States Government operates to prevent new sources of orbital 
debris through a variety of means.  Predominant among these are the U.S. Government Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, although the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration analyzes the potential for debris creation during its licensing process3, as does the 
FCC.  These processes will continue to be linked to the new STM efforts promoted by SPD-3. 
 
SPD-3 specifically orders the Administrator of NASA to work with several relevant 
federal agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission, to update and evolve the 
U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.4  Specifically, the policy mandates that the 
Chairman work with other relevant federal heads in order to develop best practices and standards 
for space traffic5, prevent radio interference with space assets6, and ensure compliance with 
international treaty obligations—most prominently the Registration Convention.7 
 
2018 proved to be a significant year for STM, which saw both SPD-3, and independent 
FCC hearings and rulemaking.  The full impacts of SPD-3 will take time to understand, both on 
space traffic management generally, and the particular regulations emerging from renewed 
Commission focus on the matter.  Given the release of the NPRM to the Federal Register on 
February 19th, 2019, and that it is open to commentary until April 5th, 2019 (with responses due 
on May 6th), much could change beyond that of the Proposed Rule.  At this stage in the process, 
there is a clear direction towards greater reporting on and assessment of orbital debris plans for 
license applicants, along with stronger efforts at preventative measures designed to take 
advantage of knowledge of how debris is generated and propagated. 
 
To that end, it is safe to conclude that the last two years have seen significant policy 
development for space activities coming from the executive branch, and that more efforts are 
underway.  In analyzing the nature and extent of the FCC’s growing role in space traffic 
                                                     
1 “The Commission has observed that robotic spacecraft are typically controlled through radiocommunications links, 
and thus there is a direct connection between the satellite’s radiocommunications functions and the physical 
operations of spacecraft.”  Mitigation of Orbital Debris, Second Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 11567, 11575, para. 
14 (2004) (Orbital Debris Order). 
2 FCC 18-159, at 7 III(13). 
3 See NOAA, Spacecraft Disposal and Orbital Debris Mitigation Plan, available at 
https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/licenseHome.html. 
4 Space Policy Directive-3, 83 Fed. Reg. 28969 (June 18, 2018), at 6. 
5 Id. at Sec. 6(f). 
6 Id. at Sec. 6(g). 
7 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention), 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 
U.N.T.S. 15 (1974). 
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management, this essay hopes to highlight three key findings stemming from SPD-3 and FCC 
regulations.  Firstly, the efforts of the FCC to stem the creation and proliferation of orbital debris 
is central to the White House’s view of the Commission’s place in a renewed space traffic 
management regime.  Secondly, the fifteen years that have elapsed between the extant rules and 
the new Proposed Rule, as well as the rapidly expanding market for constellations of satellites 
requiring FCC licensure, have taught the FCC that refreshed rules must take the experience of 
other agencies and the best practices of advisory groups into consideration for future work.  
Finally, the FCC is engaged in something of an administrative soul-searching regarding its 
proper function in the greater STM scheme going forward.  Each of these findings has, and will 
continue to have, substantial influence on STM and SSA. 
 
 
II.  Policy & Regulatory Influences 
 
In adopting new rules, the Commission is hardly working in the dark.  While some within the 
Commission question the proper nature of FCC interfacing with and enforcing debris standards 
(see below), it has been in this position before, with the orbital debris rules it adopted in 2004.8  
Then, as now, the Commission could rely on several available documents and standards to 
ascertain their own rules.  The following section briefly describes several of these, and how they 
can and do impact the current discussion between the FCC and the general public. 
 
• U.S. National Space Policy9:  The 2010 Space Policy operates as the foundational 
guidance for numerous federal efforts at securing, using, and protecting the space 
environs.  It speaks to the clear value of outer space, the necessity of its continued use, 
and that threats—including to the space environment—cannot be ignored.  President 
Obama’s opening statement for the Policy mentioned the “decades of space activity [that] 
have littered the Earth’s orbit with debris”10, and notes the United States is up to the 
challenge this poses.  Further, the document proposes to continue strengthening the 
stability of the outer space environment, which includes creating tougher measures with 
which to address orbital debris.11  Additional efforts to preserve the value of the space 
environment are described in the Policy, but most of note here is the requirement that 
heads of U.S. agencies would need to approve any exceptions to the U.S. Government 
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices.12  
 
• U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices13: In 1997, NASA and 
other partners developed what would become the primary practices document to be used 
by all federal agencies (starting in 2001) in their use of space, and these in turn were 
openly shared with industry in the hopes of encouraging best practices by public and 
                                                     
8 Mitigation of Orbital Debris, Second Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 11567, 11575, para. 14 (2004) (Orbital Debris 
Order). 
9 National Space Policy of the United States of America, available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 
10 Id. at 2. 
11 Id. at 4. 
12 Id. at 8. 
13 U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, available at https://www.iadc-
online.org/References/Docu/USG_OD_Standard_Practices.pdf. [Hereinafter U.S. Mitigation Practices.] 
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private actors alike.14  The Practices contain four objectives: 1) any space programs will 
assess how likely they are to create debris in their normal operations, and seek to limit 
debris creation; 2) programs will assess the likeliness of explosions for space 
operations—including after the mission is complete—and attempt to reduce the 
possibility of such an explosion happening; 3) programs will work to ensure their space 
objects do not collide with other man-made objects, or with natural debris from objects 
like micrometeoroids; 4) and that missions will make efforts to find cost-effective 
processes to minimize the impact of current programs on future missions.15  Each of these 
objectives contain explanatory sections that delineate programmatic behaviors to ensure 
success, though they are arguably flexible enough to allow reasonable deviation when 
expense or unique mission profiles allow. 
 
• NASA Technical Standard16:  NASA has adopted an extensive policy in order to fulfil 
NASA Procedural Requirement 8715.6 (the NASA Procedural Requirements for 
Limiting Orbital Debris).17  The standard’s weighty procedures are used in conjunction 
with NASA missions, and give that administration specific instructions that, in theory, 
will reduce the creation of new debris due to NASA’s missions.  It notes that it “is 
required to be used for orbital debris assessments for all payloads, launch vehicle orbital 
stages, and released objects….”18  Importantly, NASA views this document to be 
consistent with, and in furtherance of, the National Space Policy, the IADC Guidelines, 
and the U.S. Government Standard Practices19, which demonstrates the interconnected 
nature of both domestic and international debris policies. 
 
• IADC Guidelines20: these Guidelines set forth an international effort to combat debris 
creation, and they mirror several efforts from the United States and other individual 
States.  They are representative of the best practices recommended by several State space 
agencies, including NASA, JAXA, ROSCOSMOS, CNES, and others.21  While the 
guidance contained within the document is less dense than the NASA Technical 
Standard, the spirit remains the same—work towards eliminating new sources of debris, 
in order to preserve the future utility of the space environment for all States. 
 
• Space Policy Directive-322: Perhaps the greatest impetus for modifying the current FCC 
Orbital Debris Order (2004) comes from the actions of the Trump White House.  In his 
third Space Policy Directive, President Trump ordered a large-scale review and evolution 
of space traffic management strategy and policy.  After generally describing the ways in 
which using the space environment benefits the United States economically, 
                                                     
14 NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigation/. 
15 U.S. Mitigation Practices, supra note 13. 
16 NASA Technical Standard, available at https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/nasa/nasa-std-871914. 
17 NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris, NPR 8715.6B (current version), available at 
https://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/npr_8715_006b_.pdf. 
18 NASA Technical Standard, supra note 16, at 5. 
19 Id. 
20 Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee Guidelines, available at 
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/IADC-2002-01-IADC-Space_Debris-Guidelines-Revision1.pdf. 
21 Id. at 3. 
22 SPD-3, supra note 4, at 28969-28976. 
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scientifically, and in defense, the Directive calls for revisions to current procedures.  The 
long-used U.S. Government Standard Practices are now “inadequate to control the 
growth of orbital debris.  These standard practices should be updated to address current 
and future space operating environments.”23  Specifically, the Federal Communications 
Commission is tasked with assisting in the renovation of U.S. efforts in the field of space 
debris management, along with other relevant agencies.  Part of this requires an inter-
agency effort, of which the FCC is a member, to create better technical standards, safety 
practices, behavioral norms, and standards for the prevention of on-orbit collisions.24 
 
These are some of the primary tools the Commission had in its possession when 
redesigning their new Proposed Rule.  It can, at least in part, explain repeated references in the 
NPRM to the expertise of other agencies, including (and especially) NASA.  For instance, when 
seeking input from the public regarding the safety of flight profiles, the Commission spoke of the 
probability of collisions between objects within the LEO region, referencing the relationship 
between energy and orbit of an object via NASA’s Technical Standard.25 
 
 
III.  Proposed Rule: Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age 
 
Prior to the release of the Proposed Rule in early 2019, the Commission drafted and 
adopted a report, FCC 18-159, explaining their views on the necessity of reexamining the older 
rules.  The report also announced the proposed rules it intended to supply to the Federal Register 
for notice and comment from the public.  The Commission’s justifications for coming back to the 
topic after more than a decade ranged from the proliferation of objects in space, to the potential 
damage to the sizeable space economy from errant debris, to the harm to the health and safety of 
people on Earth.26  In reexamining their rules for orbital debris, the Commission has 
demonstrated that: 1) they are willing, able, and motivated to provide additional rigor and 
breadth to the existing rules; and 2) that they both desire and need input from the public to do so 
effectively.  The Proposed Rule may look ready to implement, but the NPRM is replete with 
dozens of questions and calls for responses to their new (potential) regulations. 
 
Some of these solicitations concern particular parties (e.g., private satellite operators, 
amateur operators, etc.).  For instance, “the Commission seeks comment on the suitability of 
various orbital debris mitigation guidance and standards for application to non-Federal satellite 
systems.”27  Others concern basic questions of added numerical details for risk assessments (e.g., 
whether percentages ought to be attached to certain kinds of behaviors or objects that could 
generate additional debris).   
 
Importantly, in its request for comments, the Commission appears particularly concerned 
with the presence and expansion of constellations of satellites.  Indeed, “proposed deployments 
                                                     
23 Id. at 28972. 
24 SPD-3, supra note 4, Sec. 6(f), at 28975. 
25 NASA Technical Standard, supra note 16. 
26 FCC 18-159, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
27 Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, NPRM, 84 Fed. Reg. 4742, 4744 (Feb. 19, 2019). 
[Hereinafter Proposed Rule] 
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of large satellite constellations in the intensely used LEO region…will have the potential to 
increase the risk of debris-generating events.”28  In several places, it seeks comments on whether 
more stringent controls need to be placed on such systems, and in what manner.  For instance, 
when addressing the safety of flight profiles:  
 
The Commission seeks comment on whether, if a spacecraft’s orbital debris mitigation 
plan includes maneuvering to avoid collisions, the Commission should, consistent with 
current licensing practice, consider the risk to be zero…the NASA Standard applies the 
0.001 metric on a per-spacecraft basis.  The Commission invites comment on whether 
this metric should also be applied on an aggregate, system-wide basis, i.e., 0.001 for an 
entire constellation.29 
 
Other commentary on constellations, and their impact on the debris potential, appear on 
no fewer than ten pages of the NPRM.  Clearly, large-scale operations currently weigh heavily 
on the minds of the Commissioners. 
 
Taken as a whole, and far from flailing about looking for its raison d’être in 
governmental debris management policy, the sea of questions presented in the NPRM indicate 
the seriousness with which the Commission is taking its mandate.  The extent of their probing 
serves the concerns of Commissioners who felt that more information was needed, especially 
concerning the issue of expertise.30  Given the importance attached to the issue by the 
Commission’s statements in FCC 18-159, the questions posed will serve as a potentially rich 
vein of policy and technical wisdom from which a Final Rule can be crafted.  If this turns out not 
to be true, and if the feedback the Commission receives is largely unhelpful, at the very least 
they have made clear their reasoning in propounding their draft of the Proposed Rule.  From this, 
it can be taken that the Commission is certainly moving regulation on the matter of debris—
whether forwards or otherwise remains to be seen, although FCC 18-159 is clear that waiting to 
address the perceived problem is not an option, especially in light of continuous and increasing 
use of the orbital environment. 
 
The domestic pressures to revise regulations are one of the factors driving this NPRM.  
However, another reason for the reconsideration of the earlier rules is conformity with 
international law and policy.  The Commission references both the sustainability guidelines of 
UNCOPUOS31, and the IADC Mitigation Guidelines32 as critical to its work.  Redrafting 
licensing requirements and standards to accord with those documents reflects the international 
level of concern involved whilst simultaneously serving the spirit of the National Space Policy 
and subsequent executive guidance. 
 
 
IV.  Informational & Operational Norms 
 
                                                     
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 4745. 
30 See, e.g., FCC 18-159, supra note 2, Statement of Commissioner Carr, at 61. 
31 UN COPUOS Sustainability Guidelines, UN Document A/AC.105/L.315 (2018). 
32 IADC Guidelines, supra note 20. 
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The Proposed Rule focuses predominantly on two methods of combating orbital debris: 
firstly, disclosure of germane information in the form of reporting by applicants for licensure.  
Secondly, the Commission is recommending operational procedures to enhance safety of 
operations for satellites and space objects used to deploy them.  The Proposed Rule both 
modifies and adds to the current rule in several key ways, each of which are designed to fulfil the 
Commission’s goals of serving the public interest. 
 
In one informational evolution, the Commission has revised requirements involving the 
assessment of and planning for the release of debris during natural operations of satellites. Prior 
to the NPRM, the rule required the satellite operator to assess and minimize the possibility of the 
release of new sources of debris.33  However, this did not include a requirement to assess 
whether any deployment devices, i.e. devices launched into space that then release satellites into 
orbit, are to be used, nor did it require operators to justify why they chose to use any unorthodox 
methods in deployment.  The Proposed Rule rectifies this, by requiring a “statement [that] must 
include an orbital debris mitigation disclosure for any separate deployment devices not part of 
the space station launch that may become a source of orbital debris”34.  This is required in 
several parts of the new rule35, and ostensibly would serve to require justifying36 the use of 
materials that could enhance the creation of new debris. 
 
Likewise, the original rule did not account for the possibility that liquids could 
themselves, once outside of their spacecraft, become sources of debris.  The Proposed Rule 
requires “a statement that the space station operator has assessed and limited the probability of 
accidental explosions or release of liquids that could become debris during and after completion 
of mission operations.”37 
 
Another change requires more information about safety of flight profiles (for instance, 
curiously, current rules require an assessment of the probability of collision in space, but do not 
require a specific probability estimation to be provided; i.e., no numeric value need be applied to 
the probability).38  In contrast, the NPRM requires a metric to be adopted that is derived from the 
NASA Standard, specifically that “the probability that their spacecraft will collide with a large 
object during the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft will be no greater than 0.001”.39 
 
Some of the proposed Operational requirements include requiring that stations planned 
for operation in the 650-2,000 km range be deployed below the 650 km mark, and then 
maneuvered into the proper position.40  The reasoning behind this being that objects in LEO are 
thought to generally fall back to the Earth within a 25 year period when not corrected or 
maintained, which limits their risk as potential objects for collision. 
 
                                                     
33 47 CFR § 25.114(d)(14)(i). 
34 Proposed Rule, supra note 27, Sec. 5.64(b)(1), at 4754. 
35 Id., Sec. 25.114(d)(14)(i), at 4755. 
36 FCC 18-159, supra note 2, at 9. 
37 Proposed Rule, supra note 27, Sec. 5.64(b)(3), at 4754. 
38 47 CFR § 25.114(d)(14)(iii). 
39 FCC 18-159, supra note 2, at 10. 
40 Proposed Rule, supra note 27, Sec. 25.114(d)(14)(v)(C)(2), at 4756. 
 8 
There are several other significant changes, but one that deserves particular attention is 
the notion of operator insurance, and the concept of indemnifying the government.  The prior 
debris order  
 
…declines to adopt a rule requiring space station operator to obtain insurance to protect 
the United States from exposure to liability claims arising from orbital debris, but states 
insurance and liability issues will continue to play a role in the determination of whether 
approval of a particular debris mitigation plan serves the public interest.41 
 
In contrast, the Proposed Rule requires that, “as a condition of their licenses for 
experimental satellite facilities, licensees must submit an executed agreement indemnifying the 
United States against any costs associated with a claim brought against the United States related 
to the authorized facilities.”42  Such an indemnification requirement is a strong step in 
recognizing the damage that can occur not only to the physical environment of space, but to the 
United States more generally should damage occur for which it could be found liable. 
 
Given these changes, the Proposed Rule differs most substantially from the 2004 Rule in 
its expansive, if occasionally confused43 efforts to comply with SPD-3’s mandates while also 
updating its own regulations with new informational and operational tasks, all of which are 
designed to address the overarching problem of debris generation.  Further, while these efforts 
clearly do not directly address Space Policy Directive-3’s very specific command to renovate the 
U.S. Government Orbital Debris Standard Practices, they can be seen as a step in the direction of 
creating new “guidelines for satellite design and operation”.44  With the SPD-3 contemplating the 
incorporation of new standards into licensing regimes for the various agencies involved in space 
operations45, the FCC’s efforts in revising their own processes independently of a new set of U.S. 
Standard Practices indicates an effort to get ahead of the inter-agency game, and to continue 
propounding appropriate rules as it sees fit under its current regulatory mandate. 
 
 
V.  Existential Communications Commission? 
 
The final rule will be some time in coming, but some in the FCC have begun to question 
whether they are even the appropriate body to address orbital debris.  In both the November 2018 
report notifying the decision to update their rules, and again in the Proposed Rule, there is 
evidence of discomfort in a communications branch regulating space traffic management issues.  
Specifically, Commissioner Carr noted that they are literally dealing with rocket science, and as 
such, asks “are we the expert agency to make these assessments?...Should the FCC be one of the 
lead agencies?  Should we play a supporting and coordinating role instead?”46 
 
                                                     
41 Mitigation of Orbital Debris, Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 174, September 9, 2004, p. 54586. 
42 Proposed Rule, supra note 27, Sec. 5.64(c), at 4754. 
43 The FCC’s debris platform is not being questioned here, so much so is its self-imposed questioning of the 
propriety of a communications agency tasked with the development of debris standards. 
44 SPD-3, supra note 4, Sec. 6(b)(i), at 28974. 
45 Id., Sec. 6(b)(ii), at 28974. 
46 FCC 18-159, supra note 2, Statement of Commissioner Brendan Carr, at 61-62. 
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Further, and in part to ameliorate Commissioner Carr’s concerns, the Proposed Rule’s 
initial data-gathering segment is littered with requests for comment by anyone or any group with 
something to say on the new rules.  Moreover, the Commission asks whether they are even the 
best group to deal with the matter of orbital debris, or if other agencies would be better suited.  It 
states: 
 
“More broadly, the Commission seeks comment on the appropriate role of the 
Commission given the various stakeholder agencies and other entities.  As discussed 
above, there are a number of agencies and entities with expertise and interest in 
mitigating the growth of orbital debris.  With various entities playing a role, how does the 
Commission ensure an appropriate, coordinated approach that avoids duplication of 
efforts?  How can the Commission ensure clarity regarding the roles that various entities 
can or should play?  What agency or entity has the greatest expertise when it comes to the 
technical, engineering, mathematic, and scientific expertise needed to address orbital 
debris?”47 
 
While not directly doubting its own capabilities, the Commission shows no qualms in 
querying the public for direct thoughts on which agencies ought to handle these issues.  As an 
arm of the White House’s efforts on modifying the current STM approach, such solicitations 
could assist in properly placing the Commission’s work in conjunction with those of entities like 
NASA and the Department of Defense.  Further, despite expressing some doubt as to their 
mandate, the Commission muddled through with its proposal.  Given the flexibility suggested in 
the justification and question sections preceding the actual Proposed Rule, it would not be 
surprising to see some of the informational and operational rules shift in tone and extent when 
the Final Rule is released. 
 
In contrast to the questioning posed by her colleagues, Commissioner Rosenworcel is 
confident in the necessity of the FCC’s work to reign in orbital debris.  In her concurrence to the 
decision to propose new rules, she expresses frustration that the Commission is not being 
forceful enough in tackling the problem.  Indeed, “instead of moving forward aggressively—as 
our draft effort contemplated—we backtrack and add confusing language about whether or not 
this work should even continue in these halls.  This is not the leadership we need as we embark 
on a new era in space.”48  Commissioner Michael O’Rielly also seems comfortable with the 
FCC’s involvement in the issues, although he finds “some of the reporting proposals somewhat 
timid, and the preventative ideas may be premature or uncooked….”49  In theory, the comments 
received from the public for the NPRM may determine the “doneness” of the new regulations. 
 
 
VI.  Concluding Thoughts 
 
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of this NPRM exercise is in its possible outcomes.  
So much can change with the new rules, once input from the public has been received and 
processed.  Alternatively, perhaps the Final Rule will look nearly identical to that presently 
                                                     
47 Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 4752. 
48 FCC 18-159, supra note 2, Concurrence of Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, at 163. 
49 Id., Statement of Commissioner Michael O’Rielly, at 57. 
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proposed.  Either way, it is clear that the FCC, for whatever doubts it may possess as to its 
function in the greater orbital debris and STM schemes, is situated to continue impacting federal 
efforts to minimize threats to the use, exploration, and exploitation of orbital space.  With both 
internal Commission and external administrative pressures to adapt to the future of orbital debris 
management, the FCC remains firmly ensconced as a policy and regulatory force in STM. 
